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In The Absence Of Any Textual Support In The Language Ofl.C. § 63-602W(4) Itself, 
Or As Otherwise Ascertained From Underlying Legislative Intent, The District Court's 
Construction Of That Statute Must Be Rejected 
On the first question presented on this appeal, Ada County has defended the decision of the 
district court on an issue that it never actually raised before that court, or in any of the earlier 
administrative proceedings. The district court, sua sponte raised and decided, the issue that the Idaho 
Legislature's alleged intentional use of the definite article "the," rather than the indefinite article, "a," 
in its enactment of subsection (4) to LC. § 63-602W in 2012 was determinative in that court's 
construction of that subsection as limiting the extent of the site improvement tax exemption to only, 
"the land developer who made the site improvements." 
The just-quoted language does not appear on the face of that statute, nor in any related 
statutory definition, nor is that implied language supported by the context of the entire statutory 
regime itself. Ironically, in phrasing this issue on this appeal, the Appellant Jayo Development left 
out at least one definite article, and several other modifiers, which are indicated in brackets in the 
restatement of that issue that is set out below: 
2. Whether the district court in [the] aid of [its] statutory interpretation [ ofJ LC. 
§ 63-602W(4) impermissibly relied upon "implied" language, ("the land 
developer who made the site improvements"), that neither appears on the face 
of the statute itself, nor finds any textual support in any other part of that law? 
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In addressing this question, Ada County admits the absence of any statutory definition in 
support of the district court's construction of the statute (Respondent's brief, pg. 5), but then turns 
to the "purpose and intent" of the legislature, as revealed by a partial quote from the Statement of 
Purpose that accompanied the bill by which subsection ( 4) to I.C. § 63-602W was first enacted in 
2012. That language, as set out on page 5 of Ada County's Respondent's Brief (a complete copy of 
that Statement of Purpose was attached as Exhibit C to the July 31, 2013 Affidavit of Michael R. 
Jones (R., pg. 57)), and as again stated here, declares: 
In the proposed bill, that portion of value created by the site improvements in the 
course of a land developer's business is exempt from property tax until a building 
begins or the title is conveyed from the land developer. 
Statement of Purpose, H.B. 519, 61 st Idaho Legislature, Second Regular Session (2012) ( emphasis 
added). 
Ada County's argument, as set out at the bottom of page 5 and continuing to the top of page 
6 of its Respondent's brief, is well taken. It is the creation of the site improvements that enhance 
the value of the raw land which is the focus of the tax exemption that is at issue on this appeal. 
While the language used in the 2012 statute was intended to achieve that result, it also 
unintentionally excluded individuals, such as Doug Jayo, who was the principal owner and investor 
in both Jayo Construction and Jayo Development. The investment and value created by the site 
improvements at issue remained just as much a part of Jayo Development, as it was a part of Jayo 
Construction. This is exactly what was addressed in the 2013 clarification amendment, which point 
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will be further addressed later in this Reply Brief. 
It is important to stay focused on the basis of the district court's decision on this particular 
point, which was that the Idaho Legislature allegedly made an intentional choice concerning the 
statutory language of subsection ( 4) ofl.C. § 63-602W to use, "the," rather than, "a" to modify, "land 
developer," so as to only indicate "the land developer who made the site improvements," and to 
exclude all others. Therefore, the Appellant Jayo Development believes it was rather careless of this 
same legislature to use both modifiers in the same sentence to describe that same developer in the 
excerpt from the Statement of Purpose upon which Ada County now relies, as highlighted in the 
excerpt set out just above. At best, this reference creates some ambiguity. At worst, it cast doubts 
as to the underlying basis for the district court's entire analysis, which seems rather dubious to begin 
with. 
Finally, in the last two paragraphs of the argument it makes on page 6 of its Respondent's 
Brief Ada County first asks what it apparently only intended to be a rhetorical question: 
In the event any land developer holding the site improvements is entitled to the 
exemption until the property is sold, then when does the value of the site 
improvements ever become taxable? 
(Italicized emphasis in original; bold/underlined emphasis added). The answer to this question 
seems self-evident. It is when the property is sold, which is implicit in the very purpose of the 
business of the land developer!! To better understand this, it may be worthwhile to again examine 
that actual language of subsection ( 4) which addresses the loss of the exemption: 
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( 4) Site improvements that are associated with land, such as roads and 
utilities, on real property held by the land developer, either as owner or vendee in 
possession under a land sale contract, for sale or consumption in the ordinary course 
of the land developer's business until other improvements, such as buildings or 
structural components of buildings, are begun or the real property is conveyed to a 
third party. For purposes of this subsection, a transfer of title to real property to a 
legal entity of which at least fifty percent (50%) is owned by the land developer, the 
land developer's original entity or the same principals who owned the land 
developer's original entity shall not be considered a conveyance to a third party. 
[The remainder of the subsection, which has been omitted, addresses how the amount 
of the exemption is to be determined] .... 
I.C. § 63-602W( 4) (bracketed reference added). 
Ada County's final argument, as made at the bottom of page 6 of its brief is, "To read the 
statute as urged by Appellant would be not only unreasonable but would significantly enlarge the 
scope of the exemption." Respondent's Brief at pg. 6. Jayo Development's argument is based upon 
the amendments to I.C. § 63-602W(4) that were actually adopted by the Idaho Legislature in 2013 
and that are now the law. Whether or not the effect of this amendment actually did enlarge the scope 
of the exemption or not, or whether Ada County actively opposed that amendment, is now a moot 
point. At the time de novo review before the district court was commenced, the case was decided 
by that court, and this appeal was brought, the position advocated by the Appellant Jayo 
Development was the law of Idaho, as adopted by the Idaho Legislature. 
Whatever minimal support may have ever existed for the district court's construction of the 
subsection (4) of LC.§ 63-602W, as originally enacted in 2012, had been entirely eliminated by the 
time the de novo review before the district court had been commenced after the 2013 clarifying 
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amendment had been enacted, and administrative Rule 620 had been allowed to lapse. Therefore, 
this Court should reverse the decision of the district court denying Jayo Development the 2012 site 
improvement tax exemption. 
B. Because The District Court Was Bound By The De Novo Standard Of Review Under 
J.C.§ 63-3812(c), The Fact Rule 620 Was No Longer In Effect, And Had In Fact Been 
Superseded By The 2013 Amendments to J.C.§ 63-602W(4) At The Time That Court 
Undertook Its Review Of This Case, Was Controlling As To Its Decision 
On the second question that Ada County has addressed in its Respondent's Brief, concerning 
the district court's application and continued reliance upon the then-lapsed Rule 620 at the time it 
rendered its decision on de novo review, Ada County has argued that, "Appellant has not cited any 
case law holding that appellate courts are to take into account the expiration of an administrative 
regulation when making a decision on appeal." See, Respondent's Brief at pg. 7, last sentence 
(Italicized emphasis in original). 
When Jayo Development filed its initial Petition for Judicial Review before the district court 
on April 30, 2013, it noted in the second paragraph of that petition that, "This petition for judicial 
review shall be determined upon a trial de novo, as provided by LC.§ 63-3812(c)." (R., pg. 5). 1 An 
That subsection ofl.C. § 63-3812 provides as follows: 
( c) Appeals may be based upon any issue presented by the appellant to the 
board of tax appeals and shall be heard and determined by the court without a jury 
in a trial de novo on the issues in the same manner as though it were an original 
proceeding in that court. The burden of proof shall fall upon the party seeking 
affirmative relief to establish that the decision made by the board of tax appeals is 
erroneous. A preponderance of the evidence shall suffice to sustain the burden of 
proof. The burden of proof shall fall upon the party seeking affirmative relief and the 
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appeal upon a trial de novo means that the case was to be tried before the district court as if it had 
never been heard before. Turner v. City of Twin Falls, 144 Idaho 203, 211, 159 P.3d 840, 848 
(2007), citing to, Gilbert v. Moore, l 08 Idaho 165, 168, 697 P .2d 1178, 1182 (1985). The judicial 
review statute, LC.§ 63-3812(c), as set out in the footnote below, declares that the appeal will be 
heard "in the same manner as though it were an original proceeding in that court." Inherent in such 
a trial de novo proceeding is the ability to present evidence that was either not presented, or was not 
available, in the earlier administrative proceedings. See, I.C. § 63-3812(c) and Canyon County 
Board of Equalization v. Amalgamated Sugar Co., 143 Idaho 58, 60, 137 P.3d 445, 447 (2006) 
("Where the district court conducts a trial de novo in an appeal of a BT A decision, this Court defers 
to the district court's findings of fact that are supported by substantial evidence, .... "). 
Jayo Development already has set out in its opening brief on this appeal the chronology of 
events that existed at the time it filed its Petition for Review before the district court in 2013, and 
the then-known effect of the legislative action that had been taken by the 2013 Idaho Legislature on 
Rule 620, as expressly declared in the Statement of Purpose to that 2013 legislation. That single 
paragraph from Jayo Development's opening brief is again restated here: 
burden of going forward with the evidence shall shift as in other civil litigation. The 
court shall render its decision in writing, including therein a concise statement of the 
facts found by the court and conclusions oflaw reached by the court. The court may 
affirm, reverse or modify the order, direct the tax collector of the county or the state 
tax commission to refund any taxes found in such appeal to be erroneously or 
illegally assessed or collected or may direct the collection of additional taxes in 
proper cases. 
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Jayo Development Inc.' s petition for de novo review by the district court was 
filed on April 30, 2013 (R., pg. 4), shortly after the 2013 Idaho Legislature had 
adjourned on April 4, 2013. The 2013 clarifying amendments to I.C. § 63-602W(4) 
became law on April 4, 2013 without the governor's signature, retroactive to January 
1, 2013. See, 2013 Ida.Sess.L, Ch. 276, § 2, pg. 715. A portion of the Statement of 
Purpose that accompanied the 2013 clarifying amendments declared in respect to this 
question that: 
The State Tax Commissioners voted in November 2012 to allow the 
Site Improvement temporary administrative rule 620T to expire. 
They did not approve a permanent administrative rule with the 
recommendation that new legislation this session would provide the 
needed clarification. 
Statement of Purpose, H.B. 242, Sixty Second Idaho Legislation, First Session (2013) 
(R., pg. 59). 
Jayo Development's Appellant's Brief at pp. 24-25. 
Ada County has further argued that, "Appellant has failed to cite any expression oflegislative 
intent indicating that the Idaho Legislature intended for the expiration of Rule 620 to have any 
retroactive effect on decisions regarding exemption for tax year 2012." See, Respondent's Brief, at 
pg. 8. Of course, the just-cited declaration that was made in the Statement of Purpose to the 2013 
"clarifying amendment," is certainly an expression of legislative intent as to the "needed 
clarification" as to the original intent of the 2012 enactment of the exemption. But perhaps more to 
the point are the long-standing rules of law that apply in this situation, first as summarized in 
Hamilton v. Reeder Flying Service, 135 Idaho 568, 21 P.3d 890 (2001): 
An agency construction will not be followed if it contradicts the clear 
expression of the legislature. Rim View Trout Co. v. Higginson, 121 Idaho 819,824, 
828 P.2d 848, 853 (1992). In other words, if the language is unambiguous, an 
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agency's interpretation contrary to the plain meaning of the statute will not be given 
deference. Id. at 824, 828 P.2d at 853. If the statutory language is clear and 
unambiguous, statutory construction is unnecessary and this Court need merely apply 
the statute. Kootenai Elec. Coop., Inc. v. Washington Water Power Co., 127 Idaho 
432,435,901 P.2d 1333, 1336 (1995) .... 
135 Idaho at 572, 21 P.3d at 894. This rule is buttressed by the related principle that a court should 
not enforce an agency regulation that is nothing more than an attempt to re-write a statute. Moses 
v. Idaho State Tax Commission, 118 Idaho 676, 680-81, 799 P.2d 964, 968-69 (1990) and Bogner 
v. State Dept. of Revenue and Taxation, 107 Idaho 854, 856, 693 P.2d 1056, 1058 (1984). 
In sum, at the time de novo review was commenced before the district court, Rule 620 had 
lapsed in deference to the legislative clarification of LC. § 63-602W( 4), which had become law 
almost a month before Jayo Development filed its Petition for Judicial Review. As argued below 
in further reply to the response of Ada County on this appeal, those 2013 amendments to that statute 
operated to clarify the meaning of subsection (4) to I.C. § 63-602W, as originally enacted in 2012, 
and therefore should operate and be given effect to Jayo Development's tax exemption claim for the 
2012 tax year. 
C. The Rule On The Application Of "Clarifying Amendments," And The Rule On 
Retroactive Application Of New Laws, Are Separate Rules Of Statutory Construction 
That Are To Be Independently Applied 
Ada County has cited and relied upon a California U.S. District Court decision, which itself 
construes and applies California law, in rebuttal to the Idaho law that was cited and relied upon by 
Jayo Development in its opening brief concerning the 2013 clarification amendment to LC. § 63-
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602W(4). See, Respondent's Brief, at pp. 10-11. As a general rule Idaho courts are not bound by 
the Idaho federal court's interpretation ofldaho law, much less being bound by a California federal 
court's interpretation of unrelated California law. See, Castorena v. General Electric, 149 Idaho 
609,620,238 P.3d 209,220 (2010) ("This Court is not bound by federal courts' interpretations of 
Idaho law, see State v. Harmon, 107 Idaho 73, 76, 685 P.2d 814, 817 (1984), such interpretations 
have no precedential authority with this Court. Furthermore, we disagree with the Adams court's 
analysis. [referring to the cited analysis of the U.S. District Court for Idaho in, Adams v. Armstrong 
World Industries, 596 F.Supp. 1407 (D.Idaho 1984), rev 'don other grounds by, 847 F.2d 589 (9th 
Cir.1988) ]"). 
As based upon this cited California authority, Ada County has then argued that the Idaho 
Legislature's declaration as to its own intent, as set out in the Legislature's Statement of Purpose to 
the 2013 clarifying amendment (R., pg. 59) is not determinative of the legislature's intent. See, 
Respondent's Brief, at pg. 11. While legislative history in Idaho has always been rather scant, these 
"Statements of Purpose," have been in use by the Idaho Legislature for well over forty years and 
have in fact been relied upon by the courts for "guidance" as to legislative intent in a variety of 
contexts. See e.g., Farmers National Bankv. Green River Dairy, LLC, 155 Idaho 853,860, n.4, 318 
P.3d 622,629 n. 4 (2014) ((J., J. Jones, dissenting). In addition to the 2013 Statement of Purpose, 
a sampling of the testimony provided recorded before the germane legislative committees (R., pp. 
61-73) confirmed the clarifying purpose behind the 2013 amendment to subsection ( 4) of LC.§ 63-
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602W(4) concerning the conveyance language. See, Appellant's Brief at pp. 20-21. There is little 
else in the way oflegislative history in Idaho upon which to rely.2 
Both the original enactment of subsection (4) ofI.C. § 63-602W in 2012, and the 2013 
clarification amendment to that subsection, were passed the Idaho Legislature with "retroactivity 
clauses." The 2012 Act declared: 
SECTION 3. An emergency existing therefor, which emergency is hereby 
declared to exist, this act shall be in full force and effect on and after its passage and 
approval, and retroactively to January 1, 2012. 
Chapter 192 of the Laws of 2012, § 3 at pg. 519. And the 2013 Act likewise declared: 
SECTION 2. An emergency existing therefor, which emergency is hereby 
declared to exist, this act shall be in full force and effect on and after its passage and 
2 Justice Jim Jones, in dissent, in Farmers National Bank v. Green River Dairy, 
commented as follows: 
Although the statement of purpose that accompanies a piece of legislation 
may not always be the best source for determining legislative intent, this Court has 
often looked to the statement of purpose for guidance. In KGF Development, LLC 
v. City of Ketchum, 149 Idaho 524, 236 P .3d 1284(2010), we looked to the statement 
of purpose accompanying a bill to determine the Legislature's intent behind a statute, 
as well as a city's statement of purpose for an ordinance to determine the intent 
behind the ordinance. Id. at 528-29, 236 P.3d at 1288-89. Likewise, in Stuart v. 
State, 149 Idaho 35, 44, 46,232 P.3d 813,822,824 (2010), we placed reliance on a 
legislative statement of purpose in determining legislative intent. Here, the 
Statement of Purpose is consistent with statements made before legislative 
committees by the bill's sponsor, a respected member of the Legislature. While 
opposition statements focus on the efficacy of the language in the bill to accomplish 
the stated intent, there is no dispute as to the intended purpose of the bill. 
155 Idaho at 860, n.4, 318 P.3d at 629 n. 4 (J., J. Jones, dissenting). 
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approval, and retroactively to January 1, 2013. 
Chapter 276 of the Laws of 2013, § 2 at pg. 715. 
Both of the two retroactivity clauses as contained in each of these enactments is squarely 
within the authority conferred under I.C. § 73-101. What the Appellate Jayo Development has 
argued for on this appeal, as supported by the Idaho authority cited in its opening brief, is supported 
by the general authority provided by Sutherland on Statutory Construction, as also cited in its 
opening brief. The Sutherland treatise declares: 
An amendment which in effect construes and clarifies a prior statute must be 
accepted as the legislative declaration of the meaning of the original act, where the 
amendment was adopted soon after the controversy arose concerning the proper 
interpretation of the statute. This has led courts to logically conclude that a [sic] 
amendment was adopted to make plain what the legislation had been all long from 
the time of the statute's original enactment. 
lA Sutherland Statutory Construction§ 22:31 Construction of amendatory acts-Defects in original 
act. Although not cited by Sutherland, State v. Reed, 154 Idaho 120, 123, 294 P.3d 1132, 1135 
(2012) cites the general proposition that, "the legislature also makes amendments to clarify or 
strengthen the existing provisions of a statute," and citing in support, Pearl v. Bd. of Prof'! 
Discipline of Idaho State Bd. of Med., 137 Idaho 107, 113-14, 44 P.3d 1162, 1168-69 (2002); State 
v. Barnes, 133 Idaho 378,384, 987P.2d290, 296 (1999); Stonecipherv. Stonecipher, 131 Idaho 731, 
735, 963 P .2d 1168, 1172 ( 1998); State ex rel. Wright v. Headrick, 65 Idaho 148, 156, 13 9 P .2d 7 61, 
763 (1943); and In re Segregation of School Dist. No. 58from Rural High School District No. 1, 
34 Idaho 222, 228-29, 200 P. 138, 139 (1921) ("However, every change of phraseology does not 
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indicate a change of substance and intent. The change may be made to express more clearly the same 
intent or improve the diction, or it may be the result of oversight or carelessness."). 
In sum, the "express retroactivity" of a statute by means of legislative declaration, and the 
"clarification" of a statute by operation of law, involve two separate and distinct questions of 
statutory construction. The fact that the entire 2013 statute was made retroactive to January 1, 2013 
in its operation in no way affects the question of whether the changes in the "conveyance" language 
in the 2013 amendment were simply intended by the legislature to clarify how that statute was to 
operate from the time it was originally enacted in 2012 and therefore should be given effect from the 
date of that original enactment, as of January 1, 2012. Therefore, Jayo Development should be 
extended the full benefit of the site improvement tax exemption from the time of its first enactment 
in 2012. 
D. Ada County Is Not Entitled To An Award Of Attorney Fees Under J.C.§ 12-117(1) On 
This Appeal 
Ada County, should it prevail on this appeal, has requested an award of attorney's fees under 
LC. § 12-117( 1) on the basis that, "Appellant ignores well settled law on the authority of a court to 
rely on an agency regulation construing a statute and on the retroactive application of a statutory 
amendment." See, Respondent's Brief at pg. 12. 
Ada County's request for attorney's fees should be denied. At the time the de novo appellate 
review before the district court was commenced in this case, the administrative rule upon which Ada 
County and the district court have relied had lapsed and become a nullity in express deference to the 
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legislative action taken by the 2013 Idaho Legislature. See, Statement of Purpose to H.B. 242, Sixty-
Second Idaho Legislature, 1st Sess (2013) (R., pg. 59) ("The State Tax Commissioners voted in 
November 2012 to allow the Site Improvement temporary administrative rule 620T to expire. They 
did not approve a permanent administrative rule with the recommendation that new legislation this 
session would provide the needed clarification."). 
There is no support in the record for the district court's construction of the statute. Ada 
County's continued reliance upon the administrative rule after the definitive action taken by the 2013 
Idaho legislature flies in the face of the settled rules oflaw that an agency's construction oflaw will 
not be followed if it contradicts the clear expression of the legislature, or if it is nothing more than 
an attempt to re-write the statute. Hamilton v. Reeder Flying Service, 135 Idaho 568, 572, 21 P .3d 
890 894 (2001); and Moses v. Idaho State Tax Commission, 118 Idaho 676, 680-81, 799 P.2d 964, 
968-69 (1990). Here the legislative record supports the 2013 amendment as a clarification of the 
2012 enactment of subsection ( 4) to LC. § 63-602W entitling the Appellant Jayo Development to 
the site improvement tax exemption. Consequently, Ada County's request for an award of attorney's 
fees should be denied. 
II. 
CONCLUSION 
The decision of the district court denying Jayo Development, Inc. the site improvement 
property tax exemption for 2012 should be reversed. Jayo Development should be awarded its costs 
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and attorney's fees incurred in bringing this appeal. 
Respectfully Submitted this 8th day of July, 2014. 
Jones 
Attorney for the Appellant 
Jayo Development, Inc. 
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